Platform Federalism: How to Countervail Platform Power
Abstract
Platforms wield too much power over social media. That concentration is not the vision Congress had when it enacted Section 230 and made user control the policy of the United States. The two dominant responses to this problem both fail. Platform neutrality undermines the user speech interests it purports to protect by disabling governance. Platform responsibility seeks to align platform rule with the public interest through procedural and reporting requirements. By focusing on how while ignoring who governs, its indirect mechanisms capitulate to platform rule.
This Article argues for a different response: countervail platform power by building collective user power. Drawing on the structural constitution, it offers platform federalism as a prototype for dividing governance authority between platform-wide and community tiers. User communities would gain primary authority; platforms would retain enumerated powers and enforcement against specified community-level transgressions. A platform compact reached through collective bargaining would set the boundary between these authorities, and intermediary-liability protections could be conditioned on the creation of this structure. Platform federalism promises neither a panacea nor an escape from the politics of content moderation. It offers a more democratic structure for platform governance by dividing platform power.
Citation
@article{monteiro2026,
author = {Monteiro, Artur Pericles L.},
title = {Platform Federalism: How to Countervail Platform Power},
journal = {Berkeley Technology Law Journal},
volume = {41},
date = {2026-05-01},
url = {https://www.arturpericles.art/publications/platform-federalism/},
langid = {en}
}